<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Book &quot;Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11&quot;: In a Nutshell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Satoh, Keiichi; Machimura, Takashi; Tatsumi, Tomoyuki; Kim, JiYoung; Kim, Sunmee; Tan, Uichi; Murase, Hiroshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>DISASTER, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIETY: Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan = 災害・基盤・社会</td>
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INTRODUCTION

“Even though Japan experienced a severe nuclear power plant accident in March 11 (3/11), 2011, nothing has changed. The Japanese government still sets nuclear energy as one of the basic national energy sources and keeps restarting nuclear reactors which were stopped after 3/11. People remain silent about the accident and don’t try to make their voices heard.” ----This is a typical reaction among people in Japan as well as outside of Japan, particularly among those who are critical of nuclear power. It is certainly true that Japan has not witnessed significant formal policy change on nuclear energy. At least, not as much as one might expect in a country that experienced such a severe accident.

However, this reaction grasps just part of the whole picture of Japan after 3/11. In fact, there has been considerable change in Japanese energy policy and in many aspects of civil society. Since 3/11, only three out of a total of 54 reactors (including the four broken Fukushima Daiichi reactors) have operated at any one time. This is because of changes to safety standards and because a number of district court rulings have prevented the resumption of certain reactors. Since 3/11, public opinion polls consistently show that 60 percent of people are against nuclear energy (Iwai and Shishido 2015). There were demonstrations across Japan throughout 2011, some of which have continued up until now, five years after the accident. This includes the demonstrations held in front of the prime minister’s office which attracted the largest number of participants of any anti-nuclear demonstrations held in Japan since 3/11 (Oguma 2016; Kinoshita 2017).

While it is too early to judge whether these seeds of change will eventually have a significant impact on the society, it is very important that we record the experiences of a civil society in motion. Moreover, it is very easy to judge that nothing has changed. From
our perspective, however, this judgement benefits the powerful forces that would try to dismiss the changes that have taken place. In a time where history has not yet been determined, it is more important that we pay attention to whether there were people trying to effect change, than whether or not their attempts were successful (Satoh 2016a: 209).

A number of studies have recorded the changes in civil societies after 3/11. These include studies of demonstrations (Kinoshita 2017; Oguma 2016; Oguma 2013; Hirabayashi 2013) and shifts in public opinion (Iwai and Shishido 2015). But to our knowledge, none of the existing studies have tried to grasp the whole picture of citizen activism nation-wide, nor to cover the variety of their activities. This includes not only demonstrations, but other activities as well. We therefore conducted a nation-wide survey of various citizen groups which were active around nuclear and energy related issues after 3/11 in 2013 and published a book in 2016. Here we will report our findings very briefly. We refer interested readers who would like to know more to our original book in Japanese (Machimura and Satoh eds. 2016).

RESEARCH PROCESS

Data Collection

In this subsection, we briefly report how the data was collected. We sampled the target citizen groups from the following two sources:

• Newspaper articles in major nation-wide daily newspapers (Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun): We coded all the groups appearing in the articles published on March 12, 2011 and March 31, 2012 with the following paired keywords: “nuclear (原発 gempatsu) & citizen (市民 shimin),” “nuclear and groups (団体 dantai),” “energy (エネルギー) & citizen,” and “energy & group.”

• “The Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World” held in Yokohama on January 14, 2012: We coded all groups that participated in this event.

After coding, we located the approximately 1600 groups on the Internet. Out of them we could obtained the addresses of 904 citizen groups (779 groups coded from the newspaper articles, 93 groups coded from the conference and 32 groups coded from the both sources) and sent them a questionnaire in February and March 2013. The questionnaire covered various nuclear- and energy-related issues after 3/11. We distributed our questionnaire by post and received answers from 326 groups (response rate: 36.1%).

In addition to the survey, we conducted interviews with citizen groups and carried out participant-observation in order to gain further insights for the analysis.

Data Composition

The composition of the respondent groups was as follows:

• Year established: 211 groups (66.2%) were established before 3/11 and 110 groups (33.7%) were established after 3/11.

• Legal Status: About half of the groups (57.7%) were private organizations with no legal status (任意団体 nin’i dantai). Another 15.3% had NPO status, and the remainder have a variety of legal statuses. Among those groups established after 3/11, 80.9% lacked any legal status.

• Location: Most groups had offices in Tokyo (62 groups, 19.0%), followed by Fukushima and Kyoto (26 groups, 8.0% respectively). Half of the respondent groups were located within the Tohoku and Kanto regions.

In the following section, we discuss the
following questions based on this data.\textsuperscript{2} (1) How the groups were established, (2) What issue they engaged with (3) How active were they in terms of advocacy and mobilization.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GROUPS**

**Background**

In the previous section, we mentioned that almost one third of the respondent groups were established after 3/11. This suggests that many an enormous number of new groups were created just within two years after 3/11 (with our survey being conducted in 2013).

JiYoung Kim analyzed the background to the establishment of these groups (Table 1). On the one hand, some respondent groups had direct connections with the experience of the disaster, such as being victims of the earthquake or the nuclear accident (29.0%) or having members from the disaster-stricken area (20.7%). However, only such a direct experience could not account for the creation of such an enormous number of new groups, because only around 30% of the respondents at most checked these items. On the other hand, almost half of the groups were also driven by concerns about problems in politics or corporate governance.

Using the result shown in Table 1, Kim analyzed the combination of the reasoning for the establishment by each group (Table 2). For example, if one group checked any of the items in level A (personal level) and in level B, the group is sorted as type “A+B”. The groups which were sorted into A (personal level), B (local level) or A+B account for only 4.8% in total (16 groups). Contrary to that, 73.0% (238 groups) also checked any items in level C (Japanese society level) in addition to the reasoning of A or B. This result suggests that not only the direct experience of the victimization but the awareness on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups established</th>
<th>before 3/11</th>
<th>after 3/11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=209</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Reasons on a personal level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because we were victims of the earthquake or the nuclear accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because we had members who came from the earthquake or accident area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Reasons on a local level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because our local area is in the area struck by the earthquake and tsunami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because our local area has a problem with radiation and debris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because our local area has victims who have come from the disaster-stricken area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Reasons on a Japanese society level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because we believe there are problems in politics and corporate governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because we found that support for the disaster-stricken area is lacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because we found counter measures against the disaster and accidents to be insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Multiple answers allowed
Table 2 The combination of the reasons for the engagement of the groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>before 3/11</th>
<th>after 3/11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=326</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+B</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+C</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+C</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+B+C</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none of A, B, or C</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Multiple answers allowed
Source: Kim JiYoung (2016: 88)

the problem in politics or on the lack of the support played an important driving force for the people to start their civic engagement. Based on this result, Kim argues that 3/11 was no longer “somebody else’s problem” for many people, but their own problem. But this sense of “my problem” was not only a result of direct experience, but also of self-identification with others who were suffering due to the disaster (JiYoung Kim 2016: 87-89).

In this connection, it is also meaningful to mention that the disaster stimulated the creation of many new networks. Asked about the previous connection for creating the groups, nearly two thirds (63.6%) of the 110 new groups answered that they were established by individuals without any previous connection. This shows that Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the importance of new social capital, because of the total 312 respondent groups, most (74.7%) still originated in existing groups in some ways, for example, some groups were created through the merger of existing groups (6.1%), some were established from existing groups (5.1%), and others were existing groups that just continued with their activities after the 3.11 (62.9%). In this regard, the expansion of citizen groups was rooted both in new connections as well as connections which existed before 3/11 (JiYoung Kim 2016: 91-92).

Social Impact

Once created, a group becomes a social entity that connects people and other groups. In his analysis, Keiichi Satoh focused on 70 groups established after 3/11 whose responses indicated they were created by individuals without any previous connection. The number of members of these groups varied: from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 5500 (mean of 317 and mode of 70). The total number of members of such groups accounted for 21,596 people. In addition, each group held events that brought together other people. In the questionnaire, groups were asked how many people came to their event in each period (Table 3). If we count up the average of each chosen category as an expected number of the participants, averagely ca. 650 people (totally ca. 30,000) in the first half of 2011, ca. 800 people (totally ca. 45,000) in the second half of 2011, and ca. 500 people (totally ca. 30,000) in 2012 came to their events. From this simple estimate, we can see that even just 70 new groups have a large social impact (Satoh 2016b: 106-107).

Table 3 Number of participants at events held by newly established groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>m=70</th>
<th>1 to 9</th>
<th>10 to 49</th>
<th>50 to 99</th>
<th>100 to 299</th>
<th>300 to 900</th>
<th>1,000 to 4,999</th>
<th>more than 5,000</th>
<th>Did not hold events</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First half of 2011</td>
<td>(2011.3.11-9.30)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second half of 2011</td>
<td>(2011.10.1-2012.3.31)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>(2012.4.1-to the time of survey)</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The category “Did not hold events” includes the category “group did not exist at that time”
Source: Satoh (2016b: 108)
Nevertheless, in many cases they did not survive long. According to their answers to the questionnaire, only one third of the groups adopted an organizational form that was intended to enable the group to continue its activity as a group over a longer period (Table 4) (Satoh 2016b: 107). Accordingly, although the foundation of new groups can make an enormous impact on the creation of new social networks, only some of them are sustainable.

**ISSUES**

*Six type of organizations*

In the previous section, we saw that many citizen
groups were active after 3/11. The next question is what kind of issues did they engage with? The accident forced people to face various kinds of problems. Table 5 shows the results of the answers by the groups to the question of which issues they engaged with (multiple choices were allowed). It turns out that the most checked items was “disseminating information about the nuclear accident” (62.5%), followed by “victim and evacuee support” (60.6%) and decreasing or abolishing energy (49.2%). Moreover, many group engaged with many issues simultaneously (on average six issues).

Based on a cluster analysis of these answers, Satoh identified six basic types of groups according to the patterns of issued they were engaged with (Table 6). It is notable that there are differences in the ratios among the group types with regard to the year in which they were established. Whereas most groups of the anti-nuclear and energy-shift type were established before 3/11, almost 60 percent of the health-risk type were established after 3/11. This suggests that the accident caused new types of groups to become active around energy-nuclear issues. It also means that the range of people’s imagination about nuclear energy expanded and a wider range of people were motivated to become engaged in nuclear-related issues. This accounts for why so many citizen activities spread nationwide after 3/11 (Satoh 2016c: 50-54).

### Spatial distribution of Six type of organizations

According to the analysis by Tomoyuki Tatsumi, there is a tendency for particular group types to occur in particular locations. Although Tokyo has the greatest density of citizen groups, regardless of group type, the distribution in the other areas differed based on group type. He identified three distinct distribution patterns:

- **Nationwide:** Both of types of “anti-nuclear” group (both single-issue and and multi-issue types) were located nationwide. Looking at the results in more detail, it was apparent that the “single-issue type” tended to be located in urban areas which are 50 to 150 km from the nearest nuclear reactor. On the other hand, multi-issue groups tend to be located closer to the nearest
reactor. In other words, whereas groups in urban areas tend to focus solely on the anti-nuclear issue, groups located near a nuclear power plant tend to engage in a wider variety of issues simultaneously.

- Concentrated in the area from Fukushima to Tokyo: The group types which engaged in disaster-related issues, that is, “evacuee and reconstruction support, single issue-type” and “Health risk, multi-issue type” concentrated in the area within 300 km of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant (which includes Tokyo). This is where the earthquake and tsunami struck and the risk of radiation was especially high. Interestingly, there was a concentration of “evacuee support type” groups in Kobe, suggesting that groups that supported evacuees following the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, also supported the Fukushima evacuees.

- Concentrated in Tokyo and Kansai: the remaining “Energy-shift” and “Omnidirectional type” groups were concentrated in the two largest urban areas of Tokyo and Kansai. Engaging in various issues as the “Omnidirectional type” groups did requires a large amount of resources, including expertise and finance. That is why most groups of this type were located in these two urban areas (Tatsumi 2016: 69-74).

**Attitude toward nuclear power**

In the previous subsection, we have seen that some groups engaged in activities in order to tackle the serious problems caused by the accident, such as evacuee support and health issues. We have also seen that other groups tried to avoid future problems by campaigning against nuclear energy. Though both of these activities are important, this difference in orientation often brought about disputes among theAnti-Nuclear Social Movements

**Special Issue**

**Book “Citizens Taking Action for a Nuclear Free Society: A Sociology of Social Movements after 3.11”: In a Nutshell**

Keiichi SATOH, Takashi MACHIMURA, Tomoyuki TATSUMI, JiYoung KIM, Sunmee KIM, Uichi TAN, Hiroshi MURASE
groups. Uichi Tan’s analysis illustrates the different attitudes toward nuclear power among the groups.

In the questionnaire, we asked the groups to indicate whether they had discussed the resumption of nuclear power plants suspended after 3/11 as a group. In some cases, they decided to take a stance as a group against resumption. In other cases, they did not discuss this issue, or deliberately chose not to adopt a stance on the issue as a group, in order to focus on other issues. Figure 1 summarizes the answers by group type. More than 90 percent of both the “Anti-nuclear type” and the “Omnidirectional-type” groups adopted a stance against resumption as a group. On the other hand, a majority of the “Evacuee-support type” did not express any opinion as a group against the resumption. This was because if they had expressed an opinion on the very controversial resumption problem, they would have difficulty in carrying out their main support activities.

It should also be borne in mind that residents in the contaminated area have a history living together with nuclear energy. Therefore, attitudes toward nuclear energy are highly contested among evacuees from the disaster-stricken area. In this connection, Figure 2 shows a clear tendency for groups that are located nearer to the Fukushima power plant the group to be less likely they to express an opinion against resumption. This tendency was sustained, even if we entered group type as a control variable in the logistic regression analysis. Accordingly, even if groups located in the disaster-stricken area face more direct catastrophes caused by the accident, the voices from these groups tend to be smaller as compared to the groups located far from Fukushima (Tan 2016: 146-154).

**ADVOCACY AND MOBILIZATION**

*Creation of active advocacy groups after 3/11*

After the 3/11, it became more common for Japanese civil society to engaged in politics than it had been...
before. Demonstrations were held everywhere in Japan. The percentage of people who have signed a signature or contacted a politician has also increased (Satoh and Kim 2017).

Keiichi Satoh argues that groups established after 3/11 tend to be more active in their advocacy activity. In the questionnaire, we asked respondent groups to indicate all of the authorities they had targeted through advocacy activities such as submitting written opinions or entering into direct negotiations (Table 7). The percentage of groups which have already performed these advocacy activities before 3/11 did not change significantly before or after 3/11. In other words, most of the group which had not performed advocacy before 3/11 did not do so after 3/11, despite the accident. On the other hand, groups established after 3/11 tended to be more active in advocacy. This suggests that after 3/11, many politically active groups were established, and this was the major, though not the exclusive, factor leading to the rise of various social movements after 3/11 (Satoh 2016: 43-45).

\section*{Resources and Mobilization}

Often, the age of a group also correlates with the resources it has to support their activities. As Zald and McCarthy’s (1987) resource mobilization theory suggests, older organizations tend to have more expertise, solid connections with their members and the knowledge to expand their resources. Hiroshi Murase tested this hypothesis against our data. The results, as clearly shown in Figure 3, confirmed that the older the groups is, the more annual budget they have in our data.

However, this does not necessarily suggest that the older groups are more active. If we look at the maximum number of participants at events held after 3/11, for example, there were no correlation between number of participants and the age of the groups (Figure 4). Murase concludes that the result is inconsistent with what would be expected in the original theory (Murase 2016: 186-189).

\section*{Mobilization and the Internet}

Why was there no relation between the groups resources and their capacity to mobilize? One

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{TO:} & \textbf{Established Before 3/11} & \textbf{Established after 3/11} & \\
& n=211 & 108 & \\
\hline
Municipal governments & 28.9\% & 31.8\% & 50.9\% \\
\hline
Prefectural governments & 24.6\% & 30.8\% & 43.5\% \\
\hline
Ministry and central government & 30.3\% & 35.5\% & 31.5\% \\
\hline
Political parties and politicians & 25.1\% & 30.8\% & 40.7\% \\
\hline
\multicolumn{4}{l}{Note: Multiple answers allowed} \\
\multicolumn{4}{l}{Source: Satoh(2016c: 44)} \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Advocacy activities before and after 3/11}
\end{table}
explanation seems to be the role of the internet, which, in terms of mobilization, can compensate for a relative shortage of financial resources. In this regard, Sunmee Kim’s analysis is suggestive.

Sunmee Kim identified two types of groups in regard to their use of various internet tools such as Twitter and Facebook. Almost 75 percent of the “non-active type” groups in terms of their use of internet tools were those which were established before 3/11, according to her classification (Table 8). In the non-active type, the majority of members were in their 50s, while those in the active type tended to be ten years younger. As compared to the non-active type, the active types were more active in circulating the information (80.3% of the active type hold the symposium and 60.6% of them collected...
and circulated the expert knowledge, whereas 73.0% and 47.8% of non-active type engaged with these activities, respectively).

Quite interestingly, the percentage of the groups which could organize an event that attracted more than 1,000 people was almost the same (Figure 5). This suggests that each type had an even chance of mobilizing people if they succeeded in activating their own mobilization channel properly (Kim Sunmee 2016: 130-136).

CLOSING REMARKS

In this paper, we have briefly introduced the results of our research on citizen groups engaged in nuclear-energy-related issues after 3/11. Faced with the catastrophe caused by the triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, people took action based on their own understanding about what the society needs in this emergency. As is often discussed, civil society encompasses that part of society that belongs neither to the governmental nor to the market spheres. From this perspective, we can understand that civil society is the pool of the possibility of actions which have not chosen by the political and economic system. However, their possibilities in the 3/11 disaster embodied by the various citizen groups were not fully documented. Our research was one of many attempts to record concrete evidence about how people lived and what
people did in the face of the disaster (Satoh 2016a: 206-209).

It is still uncertain if the social movements after 3/11 will eventually lead to long-term change in Japanese society. If we recall the beginning of the 1970s, when environmental pollution was a serious problem, many citizen groups were also formed to tackle it. According to the environmental white paper in 1973, there were more than 1,420 citizen environmental groups. At that time, the Asahi Shimbun conducted a questionnaire survey of the growing number of citizen groups, including environmental groups, just like in our study. We now know that these movements left a significant legacy in terms both of policy and of society in Japan. Just like the 1970s, we researchers should keep our eyes fixed on the changing society even though the results of these changes are not yet clear.

Notes

1 The questionnaire is available on our website (https://sgis.soc.hir-u.ac.jp/smosQE201305q.html).
2 In the following analysis, some questions have less than 326 respondents due to the "no answer".
3 For example, if a group answered "100 to 299 people", we counted it as "200 people" for adding up the numbers. The category "more than 5,000" was counted as 5,000.
4 These results correspond with the discourse among citizen groups after 3/11. After 3/11, many citizens expressed their regret for not being interested in the nuclear problem or not expressing their opinions about it publicly. Reflecting this, the need to engage in politics was widely discussed. It was during this time of public sentiment when the philosopher Kōjin Kojin's statement in a speech at a demonstration in Shinjuku, Tokyo on September 11, 2011 took attention among the citizens and widely shared. He stated, "some people doubt if demonstration can change the society. I think it can surely change the society, because through demonstration Japanese society becomes a society in which people demonstrate." For a critical analysis of this speech and the context behind it, see Brown (2014).
5 We asked respondent groups to indicate all of the internet items they used to distribute information and communication.

In her analysis, she counted how many internet tools each group used and classified them as active if they used more than 2.27 items (the average number of items used by all groups), and non-active if they used less than 2.27 items. The items included in the questionnaire with their answers were as follows: Group homepage (77.7%), Group mailing-list and mail magazine (42.6%), Facebook (35.1%), Twitter (31.5%), Other group’s website (26.9%), Website for video (20.0%), other SNS (4.3%), Other internet tools (4.3%) (n=305).


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